

BOOK II

Now, when I had said this, I thought I was freed from argument. 357 *a*
But after all, as it seems, it was only a prelude. For Glaucon is always most courageous in everything, and so now he didn't accept Thrasymachus' giving up but said, "Socrates, do you want to seem to have persuaded us, or truly to persuade us, that it is in every way better to be *b*
just than unjust?"

"I would choose to persuade you truly," I said, "if it were up to me."

"Well, then," he said, "you're not doing what you want. Tell me, is there in your opinion a kind of good that we would choose to have not because we desire its consequences, but because we delight in it for its own sake—such as enjoyment and all the pleasures which are harmless and leave no after effects other than the enjoyment in having them?"

"In my opinion, at least," I said, "there is a good of this kind."

"And what about this? Is there a kind we like both for its own *c*
sake and for what comes out of it, such as thinking and seeing and being healthy? Surely we delight in such things on both accounts."

"Yes," I said.

"And do you see a third form[1] of good, which includes gymnastic exercise, medical treatment when sick as well as the practice of medicine, and the rest of the activities from which money is made? We

357 c would say that they are drudgery but beneficial to us; and we would not
d choose to have them for themselves but for the sake of the wages and whatever else comes out of them."

"Yes, there is also this third," I said, "but what of it?"

"In which of them," he said, "would you include justice?"

358 a "I, for my part, suppose," I said, "that it belongs in the finest kind, which the man who is going to be blessed should like both for itself and for what comes out of it."

"Well, that's not the opinion of the many," he said, "rather it seems to belong to the form of drudgery, which should be practiced for the sake of wages and the reputation that comes from opinion;[2] but all by itself it should be fled from as something hard."

"I know this is the popular opinion," I said, "and a while ago justice, taken as being such, was blamed by Thrasymachus while injustice was praised. But I, as it seems, am a poor learner."

b "Come, now," he said, "hear me too, and see if you still have the same opinion. For it looks to me as though Thrasymachus, like a snake, has been charmed more quickly than he should have been; yet to my way of thinking there was still no proof about either. For I desire to hear what each is and what power it has all alone by itself when it is in the soul—dismissing its wages and its consequences. So I shall do it
c this way, if you too consent: I'll restore Thrasymachus' argument, and first I'll tell what kind of thing they say justice is and where it came from; second, that all those who practice it do so unwillingly, as necessary but not good; third, that it is fitting that they do so, for the life of the unjust man is, after all, far better than that of the just man, as they say. For, Socrates, though that's not at all my own opinion, I am at a loss: I've been talked deaf by Thrasymachus and countless others, while the argument on behalf of justice—that it is better than in-
d justice—I've yet to hear from anyone as I want it. I want to hear it extolled all by itself, and I suppose I would be most likely to learn that from you. That's the reason why I'll speak in vehement praise of the unjust life, and in speaking I'll point out to you how I want to hear you, in your turn, blame injustice and praise justice. See if what I'm saying is what you want."

"Most of all," I said. "What would an intelligent man enjoy talking and hearing about more again and again?"

e "What you say is quite fine," he said. "Now listen to what I said I was going to tell first—what justice is and where it came from.

"They say that doing injustice is naturally good, and suffering injustice bad, but that the bad in suffering injustice far exceeds the good in doing it; so that, when they do injustice to one another and suffer it

and taste of both, it seems profitable—to those who are not able to *358 e*
escape the one and choose the other—to set down a compact among *359 a*
themselves neither to do injustice nor to suffer it. And from there they began to set down their own laws and compacts and to name what the law commands lawful and just. And this, then, is the genesis and being of justice; it is a mean between what is best—doing injustice without paying the penalty—and what is worst—suffering injustice without being able to avenge oneself. The just is in the middle between these two, cared for not because it is good but because it is honored due to a want of vigor in doing injustice. The man who is able to do it and is *b*
truly a man would never set down a compact with anyone not to do injustice and not to suffer it. He'd be mad. Now the nature of justice is this and of this sort, and it naturally grows out of these sorts of things. So the argument goes.

"That even those who practice it do so unwillingly, from an incapacity to do injustice, we would best perceive if we should in thought do something like this: give each, the just man and the unjust, license to *c*
do whatever he wants, while we follow and watch where his desire will lead each. We would catch the just man red-handed going the same way as the unjust man out of a desire to get the better; this is what any nature naturally pursues as good, while it is law[3] which by force perverts it to honor equality. The license of which I speak would best be realized if they should come into possession of the sort of power that it is said the ancestor of Gyges,[4] the Lydian, once got. They say he was a *d*
shepherd toiling in the service of the man who was then ruling Lydia. There came to pass a great thunderstorm and an earthquake; the earth cracked and a chasm opened at the place where he was pasturing. He saw it, wondered at it, and went down. He saw, along with other quite wonderful things about which they tell tales, a hollow bronze horse. It had windows; peeping in, he saw there was a corpse inside that looked larger than human size. It had nothing on except a gold ring on its hand; he slipped it off and went out. When there was the usual *e*
gathering of the shepherds to make the monthly report to the king about the flocks, he too came, wearing the ring. Now, while he was sitting with the others, he chanced to turn the collet of the ring to himself, toward the inside of his hand; when he did this, he became invisible to those sitting by him, and they discussed him as though he were away. *360 a*
He wondered at this, and, fingering the ring again, he twisted the collet toward the outside; when he had twisted it, he became visible. Thinking this over, he tested whether the ring had this power, and that was exactly his result: when he turned the collet inward, he became invisible, when outward, visible. Aware of this, he immediately contrived to

360 a be one of the messengers to the king. When he arrived, he committed
b adultery with the king's wife and, along with her, set upon the king and killed him. And so he took over the rule.

"Now if there were two such rings, and the just man would put one on, and the unjust man the other, no one, as it would seem, would be so adamant as to stick by justice and bring himself to keep away from what belongs to others and not lay hold of it, although he had license to take what he wanted from the market without fear, and to go into houses and have intercourse with whomever he wanted, and to
c slay or release from bonds whomever he wanted, and to do other things as an equal to a god among humans. And in so doing, one would act no differently from the other, but both would go the same way. And yet, someone could say that this is a great proof that no one is willingly just but only when compelled to be so. Men do not take it to be a good for them in private, since wherever each supposes he can do injustice, he does it. Indeed, all men suppose injustice is far more to their private
d profit than justice. And what they suppose is true, as the man who makes this kind of an argument will say, since if a man were to get hold of such license and were never willing to do any injustice and didn't lay his hands on what belongs to others, he would seem most wretched to those who were aware of it, and most foolish too, although they would praise him to each others' faces, deceiving each other for fear of suffering injustice. So much for that.

e "As to the judgment itself about the life of these two of whom we are speaking, we'll be able to make it correctly if we set the most just man and the most unjust in opposition; if we do not, we won't be able to do so. What, then, is this opposition? It is as follows: we shall take away nothing from the injustice of the unjust man nor from the justice of the just man, but we shall take each as perfect in his own pursuit. So, first, let the unjust man act like the clever craftsmen. An outstanding pilot or doctor is aware of the difference between what is impossible in
361 a his art and what is possible, and he attempts the one, and lets the other go; and if, after all, he should still trip up in any way, he is competent to set himself aright. Similarly, let the unjust man also attempt unjust deeds correctly, and get away with them, if he is going to be extremely unjust. The man who is caught must be considered a poor chap. For the extreme of injustice is to seem to be just when one is not. So the perfectly unjust man must be given the most perfect injustice, and nothing must be taken away; he must be allowed to do the greatest injustices while having provided himself with the greatest reputation for justice.
b And if, after all, he should trip up in anything, he has the power to set himself aright; if any of his unjust deeds should come to light, he is

capable both of speaking persuasively and of using force, to the extent *361 b*
that force is needed, since he is courageous and strong and since he has provided for friends and money. Now, let us set him down as such, and put beside him in the argument the just man in his turn, a man simple and noble, who, according to Aeschylus,[5] does not wish to seem, but rather to be, good. The seeming must be taken away. For if he should seem just, there would be honors and gifts for him for seeming to be *c*
such. Then it wouldn't be plain whether he is such for the sake of the just or for the sake of the gifts and honors. So he must be stripped of everything except justice, and his situation must be made the opposite of the first man's. Doing no injustice, let him have the greatest reputation for injustice, so that his justice may be put to the test to see if it is softened by bad reputation and its consequences. Let him go unchanged till death, seeming throughout life to be unjust although he is *d*
just, so that when each has come to the extreme—the one of justice, the other of injustice—they can be judged as to which of the two is happier."

"My, my," I said, "my dear Glaucon, how vigorously you polish up each of the two men—just like a statue—for their judgment."

"As much as I can," he said. "With two such men it's no longer hard, I suppose, to complete the speech by a description of the kind of life that awaits each. It must be told, then. And if it's somewhat *e*
rustically told, don't suppose that it is I who speak, Socrates, but rather those who praise injustice ahead of justice. They'll say that the just man who has such a disposition will be whipped; he'll be racked; he'll be bound; he'll have both his eyes burned out; and, at the end, when he *362 a*
has undergone every sort of evil, he'll be crucified and know that one shouldn't wish to be, but to seem to be, just. After all, Aeschylus' saying applies far more correctly to the unjust man. For really, they will say, it is the unjust man, because he pursues a thing dependent on truth and does not live in the light of opinion, who does not wish to seem unjust but to be unjust,

> Reaping a deep furrow in his mind
> From which trusty plans bear fruit.[6] *b*

First, he rules in the city because he seems to be just. Then he takes in marriage from whatever station he wants and gives in marriage to whomever he wants; he contracts and has partnerships with whomever he wants, and, besides benefiting himself in all this, he gains because he has no qualms about doing injustice. So then, when he enters contests, both private and public, he wins and gets the better of his enemies. In getting the better, he is wealthy and does good to friends and harm to *c*

362 c enemies. To the gods he makes sacrifices and sets up votive offerings, adequate and magnificent, and cares for the gods and those human beings he wants to care for far better than the just man. So, in all likelihood, it is also more appropriate for him to be dearer to the gods than is the just man. Thus, they say, Socrates, with gods and with humans, a better life is provided for the unjust man than for the just man."

d When Glaucon had said this, I had it in mind to say something to it, but his brother Adeimantus said in his turn, "You surely don't believe, Socrates, that the argument has been adequately stated?"

"Why not?" I said.

"What most needed to be said has not been said," he said.

"Then," I said, "as the saying goes, 'let a man stand by his brother.'[7] So, you too, if he leaves out anything, come to his defense. And yet, what he said was already enough to bring me to my knees and make it impossible to help out justice."

e And he said, "Nonsense. But still hear this too. We must also go through the arguments opposed to those of which he spoke, those that praise justice and blame injustice, so that what Glaucon in my opinion wants will be clearer. No doubt, fathers say to their sons and exhort
363 a them, as do all those who have care of anyone, that one must be just. However, they don't praise justice by itself but the good reputations that come from it; they exhort their charges to be just so that, as a result of the opinion, ruling offices and marriages will come to the one who seems to be just, and all the other things that Glaucon a moment ago attributed to the just man as a result of his having a good reputation. And these men tell even more of the things resulting from the opinions. For by throwing in good reputation with the gods, they can tell of an inexhaustible store of goods that they say gods give to the holy. And in this way they join both the noble Hesiod and Homer. The former says that for the just the gods make the oaks

b Bear acorns on high, and bees in the middle,
And the fleecy sheep heavily laden with wool[8]

and many other very good things connected with these. And the other has pretty much the same to tell, as when he says,

As for some blameless king who in fear of the gods
c Upholds justice, the black earth bears
Barley and wheat, the trees are laden with fruit,
The sheep bring forth without fail, and the
sea provides fish.[9]

And Musaeus and his son give the just even headier goods than these from the gods. In their speech they lead them into Hades and lay them

down on couches; crowning them, they prepare a symposium of the holy, and they then make them go through the rest of time drunk, in the belief that the finest wage of virtue is an eternal drunk.[10] Others extend the wages from the gods yet further than these. For they say that a holy and oath-keeping man leaves his children's children and a whole tribe behind him. So in these and like ways they extol justice. And, in turn, they bury the unholy and unjust in mud in Hades and compel them to carry water in a sieve; and they bring them into bad reputation while they are still alive. Thus, those penalties that Glaucon described as the lot of the just men who are reputed to be unjust, these people say are the lot of the unjust. But they have nothing else to say. This then is the praise and blame attached to each.

"Furthermore, Socrates, consider still another form of speeches about justice and injustice, spoken in prose[11] and by poets. With one tongue they all chant that moderation and justice are fair, but hard and full of drudgery, while intemperance and injustice are sweet and easy to acquire, and shameful only by opinion and law. They say that the unjust is for the most part more profitable than the just; and both in public and in private, they are ready and willing to call happy and to honor bad men who have wealth or some other power and to dishonor and overlook those who happen in some way to be weak or poor, although they agree they are better than the others. But the most wonderful of all these speeches are those they give about gods and virtue. They say that the gods, after all, allot misfortune and a bad life to many good men too, and an opposite fate to opposite men. Beggar priests and diviners go to the doors of the rich man and persuade him that the gods have provided them with a power based on sacrifices and incantations. If he himself, or his ancestors, has committed some injustice, they can heal it with pleasures and feasts; and if he wishes to ruin some enemies at small expense, he will injure just and unjust alike with certain evocations and spells. They, as they say, persuade the gods to serve them. And they bring the poets forward as witnesses to all these arguments about vice, and they present it as easy, saying that,

> Vice in abundance is easy to choose,
> The road is smooth and it lies very near,
> While the gods have set sweat before virtue,
> And it is a long road, rough and steep.[12]

And they use Homer as a witness to the perversion of the gods by human beings because he too said:

> The very gods can be moved by prayer too.
> With sacrifices and gentle vows and

364 e

The odor of burnt and drink offerings, human beings
turn them aside with their prayers,
When someone has transgressed and made a mistake.[13]

And they present a babble of books by Musaeus and Orpheus, offspring of the Moon and the Muses, as they say, according to whose prescriptions they busy themselves about their sacrifices. They persuade not only private persons, but cities as well, that through sacrifices and pleasurable games there are, after all, deliverances and purifica-
365 a tions from unjust deeds for those still living. And there are also rites for those who are dead. These, which they call initiations,[14] deliver us from the evils in the other place; while, for those who did not sacrifice, terrible things are waiting.

"My dear Socrates," he said, "with all these things being said—of this sort and in this quantity—about virtue and vice and how human beings and gods honor them, what do we suppose they do to the souls of the young men who hear them? I mean those who have good natures and have the capacity, as it were, to fly to all the things that are said and gather from them what sort of man one should be and what way
b one must follow to go through life best. In all likelihood he would say to himself, after Pindar, will I 'with justice or with crooked deceits scale the higher wall' where I can fortify myself all around and live out my life? For the things said indicate that there is no advantage in my being just, if I don't also seem to be, while the labors and penalties involved are evident. But if I'm unjust, but have provided myself with a reputation for justice, a divine life is promised. Therefore, since as the
c wise make plain to me, 'the seeming overpowers even the truth'[15] and is the master of happiness, one must surely turn wholly to it. As facade and exterior I must draw a shadow painting[16] of virtue all around me, while behind it I must trail the wily and subtle fox of the most wise Archilochus.[17] 'But,' says someone, 'it's not always easy to do bad and get
d away with it unnoticed.' 'Nothing great is easy,' we'll say. 'But at all events, if we are going to be happy we must go where the tracks of the arguments lead. For, as to getting away with it, we'll organize secret societies and clubs; and there are teachers of persuasion who offer the wisdom of the public assembly and the court. On this basis, in some things we'll persuade and in others use force; thus we'll get the better and not pay the penalty.' 'But it surely isn't possible to get away from the gods or overpower them.' 'But, if there are no gods, or if they have no care for human things, why should we care at all about getting
e away? And if there are gods and they care, we know of them or have heard of them from nowhere else than the laws[18] and the poets who have given genealogies; and these are the very sources of our being told that they are such as to be persuaded and perverted by sacrifices, sooth-

ing vows, and votive offerings. Either both things must be believed or neither. If they are to be believed, injustice must be done and sacrifice offered from the unjust acquisitions. For if we are just, we won't be punished by the gods. That is all. And we'll refuse the gains of injustice. But if we are unjust, we shall gain and get off unpunished as well, by persuading the gods with prayers when we transgress and make mistakes.' 'But in Hades we'll pay the penalty for our injustices here, either we ourselves or our children's children.' 'But, my dear,' will say the man who calculates, 'the initiations and the delivering gods have great power, as say the greatest cities and those children of gods who have become poets and spokesmen of the gods and reveal that this is the case.'

"Then, by what further argument could we choose justice before the greatest injustice? For, if we possess it with a counterfeited seemly exterior, we'll fare as we are minded with gods and human beings both while we are living and when we are dead, so goes the speech of both the many and the eminent. After all that has been said, by what device, Socrates, will a man who has some power—of soul, money, body or family—be made willing to honor justice and not laugh when he hears it praised? So, consequently, if someone can show that what we have said is false and if he has adequate knowledge that justice is best, he undoubtedly has great sympathy for the unjust and is not angry with them; he knows that except for someone who from a divine nature cannot stand doing injustice or who has gained knowledge and keeps away from injustice, no one else is willingly just; but because of a lack of courage, or old age, or some other weakness, men blame injustice because they are unable to do it. And that this is so is plain. For the first man of this kind to come to power is the first to do injustice to the best of his ability. And there is no other cause of all this than that which gave rise to this whole argument of his and mine with you, Socrates. We said, 'You surprising man, of all you who claim to be praisers of justice—beginning with the heroes[19] at the beginning (those who have left speeches) up to the human beings of the present—there is not one who has ever blamed injustice or praised justice other than for the reputations, honors, and gifts that come from them. But as to what each itself does with its own power when it is in the soul of a man who possesses it and is not noticed by gods and men, no one has ever, in poetry or prose, adequately developed the argument that the one is the greatest of evils a soul can have in it, and justice the greatest good. For if all of you had spoken in this way from the beginning and persuaded us, from youth onwards, we would not keep guard over each other for fear injustice be done, but each would be his own best guard, afraid that in doing injustice he would dwell with the greatest evil.'

367 a "This, Socrates, and perhaps yet more than this, would Thrasymachus and possibly someone else say about justice and injustice, vulgarly turning their powers upside down, in my opinion at least. But I—for I
b need hide nothing from you—out of my desire to hear the opposite from you, speak as vehemently as I can. Now, don't only show us by the argument that justice is stronger[20] than injustice, but show what each in itself does to the man who has it that makes the one bad and the other good. And take away the reputations, as Glaucon told you to. For if you don't take the true reputation from each and attach the false one to it, we'll say that you aren't praising the just but the seeming, nor
c blaming being unjust but the seeming; and that you're exhorting one to be unjust and to get away with it; and that you agree with Thrasymachus that the just is someone else's good, the advantage of the stronger, while the unjust is one's own advantage and profitable, but disadvantageous to the weaker. Now, since you agreed that justice is among the greatest goods—those that are worth having for what comes from them but much more for themselves, such as seeing, hearing, thinking, and,
d of course, being healthy and all the other goods that are fruitful by their own nature and not by opinion—praise this aspect of justice. Of what profit is justice in itself to the man who possesses it, and what harm does injustice do? Leave wages and reputations to others to praise. I could endure other men's praising justice and blaming injustice in this way, extolling and abusing them in terms of reputations and wages; but from you I couldn't, unless you were to order me to, because you have spent
e your whole life considering nothing other than this. So, don't only show us by the argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but show what each in itself does to the man who has it—whether it is noticed by gods and human beings or not—that makes the one good and the other bad."

I listened, and although I had always been full of wonder at the nature of Glaucon and Adeimantus, at this time I was particularly
368 a delighted and said, "That wasn't a bad beginning, you children of that man,[21] that Glaucon's lover made to his poem about your distinguishing yourselves in the battle at Megara:

Sons of Ariston,[22] divine offspring of a famous man.

That, my friends, in my opinion is good. For something quite divine must certainly have happened to you, if you are remaining unpersuaded that injustice is better than justice when you are able to speak
b that way on its behalf. Now you truly don't seem to me to be being persuaded. I infer it from the rest of your character, since, on the basis of the arguments themselves, I would distrust you. And the more I trust you, the more I'm at a loss as to what I should do. On the one hand, I

can't help out. For in my opinion I'm not capable of it; my proof is that *368 i*
when I thought I showed in what I said to Thrasymachus that justice is
better than injustice, you didn't accept it from me. On the other hand, I
can't not help out. For I'm afraid it might be impious to be here when
justice is being spoken badly of and give up and not bring help while I *c*
am still breathing and able to make a sound. So the best thing is to suc-
cour her as I am able."

Glaucon and the others begged me in every way to help out and not to give up the argument, but rather to seek out what each is and the truth about the benefit of both. So I spoke my opinion.

"It looks to me as though the investigation we are undertaking is no ordinary thing, but one for a man who sees sharply. Since we're not clever men," I said, "in my opinion we should make this kind of *d*
investigation of it: if someone had, for example, ordered men who don't see very sharply to read little letters from afar and then someone had the thought that the same letters are somewhere else also, but bigger and in a bigger place, I suppose it would look like a godsend to be able to consider the littler ones after having read these first, if, of course, they do happen to be the same."

"Most certainly," said Adeimantus. "But, Socrates, what do you notice in the investigation of the just that's like this?" *e*

"I'll tell you," I said. "There is, we say, justice of one man; and there is, surely, justice of a whole city too?"

"Certainly," he said.

"Is a city bigger[23] than one man?"

"Yes, it is bigger," he said.

"So then, perhaps there would be more justice in the bigger and it would be easier to observe closely. If you want, first we'll investigate what justice is like in the cities. Then, we'll also go on to consider it in *369 a*
individuals, considering the likeness of the bigger in the *idea*[24] of the littler?"

"What you say seems fine to me," he said.

"If we should watch a city coming into being in speech," I said, "would we also see its justice coming into being, and its injustice?"

"Probably," he said.

"When this has been done, can we hope to see what we're looking for more easily?" *b*

"Far more easily."

"Is it resolved[25] that we must try to carry this out? I suppose it's no small job, so consider it."

"It's been considered," said Adeimantus. "Don't do anything else."

"Well, then," I said, "a city, as I believe, comes into being be-

369 b cause each of us isn't self-sufficient but is in need of much. Do you believe there's another beginning to the founding of a city?"

"None at all," he said.

c "So, then, when one man takes on another for one need and another for another need, and, since many things are needed, many men gather in one settlement as partners and helpers, to this common settlement we give the name city, don't we?"

"Most certainly."

"Now, does one man give a share to another, if he does give a share, or take a share, in the belief that it's better for himself?"

"Certainly."

"Come, now," I said, "let's make a city in speech from the beginning. Our need, as it seems, will make it."

"Of course."

d "Well, now, the first and greatest of needs is the provision of food for existing and living."

"Certainly."

"Second, of course, is housing, and third, clothing, and such."

"That's so."

"Now wait," I said. "How will the city be sufficient to provide for this much? Won't one man be a farmer, another the housebuilder, and still another, a weaver? Or shall we add to it a shoemaker or some other man who cares for what has to do with the body?"

"Certainly."

"The city of utmost necessity[26] would be made of four or five men."

e "It looks like it."

"Now, what about this? Must each one of them put his work at the disposition of all in common—for example, must the farmer, one man, provide food for four and spend four times as much time and labor in the provision of food and then give it in common to the others; or must he neglect them and produce a fourth part of the food in a *370 a* fourth part of the time and use the other three parts for the provision of a house, clothing,[27] and shoes, not taking the trouble to share in common with others, but minding his own business for himself?"

And Adeimantus said, "Perhaps, Socrates, the latter is easier than the former."

"It wouldn't be strange, by Zeus," I said. "I myself also had the thought when you spoke that, in the first place, each of us is naturally not quite like anyone else, but rather differs in his nature; different *b* men are apt for the accomplishment of different jobs. Isn't that your opinion?"

"It is."

"And, what about this? Who would do a finer job, one man practicing many arts, or one man one art?" *370 b*

"One man, one art," he said.

"And, further, it's also plain, I suppose, that if a man lets the crucial moment in any work pass, it is completely ruined."

"Yes, it is plain."

"I don't suppose the thing done is willing to await the leisure of the man who does it; but it's necessary for the man who does it to follow close upon the thing done, and not as a spare-time occupation." *c*

"It is necessary."

"So, on this basis each thing becomes more plentiful, finer, and easier, when one man, exempt from other tasks, does one thing according to nature and at the crucial moment."

"That's entirely certain."

"Now, then, Adeimantus, there's need of more citizens than four for the provisions of which we were speaking. For the farmer, as it seems, won't make his own plow himself, if it's going to be a fine one, or his hoe, or the rest of the tools for farming; and the housebuilder *d* won't either—and he needs many too. And it will be the same with the weaver and the shoemaker, won't it?"

"True."

"So, carpenters, smiths, and many other craftsmen of this sort become partners in our little city, making it into a throng."

"Most certainly."

"But it wouldn't be very big yet, if we added cowherds, shepherds, and the other kinds of herdsmen, so that the farmers would have oxen for plowing, the housebuilders teams to use with the farmers for *e* hauling, and the weavers and cobblers hides and wool."

"Nor would it be a little city," he said, "when it has all this."

"And, further," I said, "just to found the city itself in the sort of place where there will be no need of imports is pretty nearly impossible."

"Yes, it is impossible."

"Then, there will also be a need for still other men who will bring to it what's needed from another city."

"Yes, they will be needed."

"Now, if the agent comes empty-handed, bringing nothing needed by those from whom they take what they themselves need, he'll go *371 a* away empty-handed, won't he?"

"It seems so to me."

"Then they must produce at home not only enough for themselves but also the sort of thing and in the quantity needed by these others of whom they have need."

371 a "Yes, they must."

"So our city needs more farmers and other craftsmen."

"It does need more."

"And similarly, surely, other agents as well, who will import and export the various products. They are merchants, aren't they?"

"Yes."

"Then, we'll need merchants too."

"Certainly."

"And if the commerce is carried on by sea, there will also be need
b of throngs of other men who know the business of the sea."

"Throngs, indeed."

"Now what about this? In the city itself, how will they exchange what they have produced with one another? It was for just this that we made a partnership and founded the city."

"Plainly," he said, "by buying and selling."

"Out of this we'll get a market[28] and an established currency[29] as a token for exchange."

"Most certainly."

c "If the farmer or any other craftsman brings what he has produced to the market, and he doesn't arrive at the same time as those who need what he has to exchange, will he sit in the market idle, his craft unattended?"

"Not at all," he said. "There are men who see this situation and set themselves to this service; in rightly governed cities they are usually those whose bodies are weakest and are useless for doing any other job.
d They must stay there in the market and exchange things for money with those who need to sell something and exchange, for money again, with all those who need to buy something."

"This need, then, produces tradesmen in our city," I said. "Don't we call tradesmen those men who are set up in the market to serve in buying and selling, and merchants those who wander among the cities?"

"Most certainly."

e "There are, I suppose, still some other servants who, in terms of their minds, wouldn't be quite up to the level of partnership, but whose bodies are strong enough for labor. They sell the use of their strength and, because they call their price a wage, they are, I suppose, called wage earners, aren't they?"

"Most certainly."

"So the wage earners too, as it seems, go to fill out the city."

"It seems so to me."

"Then has our city already grown to completeness, Adeimantus?"

"Perhaps." *371 e*

"Where in it, then, would justice and injustice be? Along with which of the things we considered did they come into being?"

"I can't think, Socrates," he said, "unless it's somewhere in *372 a* some need these men have of one another."

"Perhaps what you say is fine," I said. "It really must be considered and we mustn't back away. First, let's consider what manner of life men so provided for will lead. Won't they make bread, wine, clothing, and shoes? And, when they have built houses, they will work in the summer, for the most part naked and without shoes, and in the winter adequately clothed and shod. For food they will prepare barley meal *b* and wheat flour; they will cook it and knead it. Setting out noble loaves of barley and wheat on some reeds or clean leaves, they will stretch out on rushes strewn with yew and myrtle and feast themselves and their children. Afterwards they will drink wine and, crowned with wreathes, sing of the gods. So they will have sweet intercourse with one another, and not produce children beyond their means, keeping an eye out against poverty or war." *c*

And Glaucon interrupted, saying: "You seem to make these men have their feast without relishes."

"What you say is true," I said. "I forgot that they'll have relishes, too—it's plain they'll have salt, olives, cheese; and they will boil onions and greens, just as one gets them in the country. And to be sure, we'll set desserts before them—figs, pulse and beans; and they'll roast myrtle-berries and acorns before the fire and drink in measure along with it. *d* And so they will live out their lives in peace with health, as is likely, and at last, dying as old men, they will hand down other similar lives to their offspring."

And he said, "If you were providing for a city of sows, Socrates, on what else would you fatten them than this?"

"Well, how should it be, Glaucon?" I said.

"As is conventional," he said. "I suppose men who aren't going to be wretched recline on couches[30] and eat from tables and have relishes and desserts just like men have nowadays." *e*

"All right," I said. "I understand. We are, as it seems, considering not only how a city, but also a luxurious city, comes into being. Perhaps that's not bad either. For in considering such a city too, we could probably see in what way justice and injustice naturally grow in cities. Now, the true[31] city is in my opinion the one we just described—a healthy city, as it were. But, if you want to, let's look at a feverish city, too. Nothing stands in the way. For these things, as it seems, won't satisfy some, or this way of life, but couches, tables, and other furniture *373 a*

373 a will be added, and, of course, relishes, perfume, incense, courtesans and cakes—all sorts of all of them. And, in particular, we can't still postulate the mere necessities we were talking about at first—houses, clothes, and shoes; but painting and embroidery must also be set in motion; and gold, ivory, and everything of the sort must be obtained. Isn't that so?"

b "Yes," he said.

"Then the city must be made bigger again. This healthy one isn't adequate any more, but must already be gorged with a bulky mass of things, which are not in cities because of necessity—all the hunters and imitators, many concerned with figures and colors, many with music; and poets and their helpers, rhapsodes, actors, choral dancers, contractors, and craftsmen of all sorts of equipment, for feminine adorn-

c ment as well as other things. And so we'll need more servants too. Or doesn't it seem there will be need of teachers, wet nurses, governesses, beauticians, barbers, and, further, relish-makers and cooks? And, what's more, we're in addition going to need swineherds. This animal wasn't in our earlier city—there was no need—but in this one there will be need of it in addition. And there'll also be need of very many other fatted beasts if someone will eat them, won't there?"

"Of course."

d "Won't we be in much greater need of doctors if we follow this way of life rather than the earlier one?"

"Much greater."

"And the land, of course, which was then sufficient for feeding the men who were then, will now be small although it was sufficient. Or how should we say it?"

"Like that," he said.

"Then must we cut off a piece of our neighbors' land, if we are going to have sufficient for pasture and tillage, and they in turn from ours, if they let themselves go to the unlimited acquisition of money, overstepping the boundary of the necessary?"

e "Quite necessarily, Socrates," he said.

"After that won't we go to war as a consequence, Glaucon? Or how will it be?"

"Like that," he said.

"And let's not yet say whether war works evil or good," I said, "but only this much, that we have in its turn found the origin of war—in those things whose presence in cities most of all produces evils both private and public."

"Most certainly."

"Now, my friend, the city must be still bigger, and not by a small

374 a number but by a whole army, which will go out and do battle with in-

vaders for all the wealth and all the things we were just now talking about." 374 c

"What," he said, "aren't they adequate by themselves?"

"Not if that was a fine agreement you and all we others made when we were fashioning the city," I said. "Surely we were in agreement, if you remember, that it's impossible for one man to do a fine job in many arts."

"What you say is true," he said.

"Well then," I said, "doesn't the struggle for victory in war seem to be a matter for art?"

"Very much so," he said.

"Should one really care for the art of shoemaking more than for the art of war?"

"Not at all."

"But, after all, we prevented the shoemaker from trying at the same time to be a farmer or a weaver or a housebuilder; he had to stay a shoemaker just so the shoemaker's art would produce fine work for us. And in the same way, to each one of the others we assigned one thing, the one for which his nature fitted him, at which he was to work throughout his life, exempt from the other tasks, not letting the crucial moments pass, and thus doing a fine job. Isn't it of the greatest importance that what has to do with war be well done? Or is it so easy that a farmer or a shoemaker or a man practicing any other art whatsoever can be at the same time skilled in the art of war, while no one could become an adequate draughts or dice player who didn't practice it from childhood on, but only gave it his spare time? Will a man, if he picks up a shield or any other weapon or tool of war, on that very day be an adequate combatant in a battle of heavy-armed soldiers,[32] or any other kind of battle in war, even though no other tool if picked up will make anyone a craftsman or contestant, nor will it even be of use to the man who has not gained knowledge of it or undergone adequate training?"

"In that case," he said, "the tools would be worth a lot."

"Then," I said, "to the extent that the work of the guardians is more important, it would require more leisure time than the other tasks as well as greater art and diligence."

"I certainly think so," he said.

"And also a nature fit for the pursuit?"

"Of course."

"Then it's our job, as it seems, to choose, if we're able, which are the natures, and what kind they are, fit for guarding the city."

"Indeed it is our job."

"By Zeus," I said, "it's no mean thing we've taken upon our-

374 e selves. But nevertheless, we mustn't be cowardly, at least as far as it's in our power."

375 a "No," he said, "we mustn't."

"Do you suppose," I said, "that for guarding there is any difference between the nature of a noble puppy and that of a well-born young man?"

"What do you mean?"

"Well, surely both of them need sharp senses, speed to catch what they perceive, and, finally, strength if they have to fight it out with what they have caught."

"Yes, indeed," he said, "both need all these things."

"To say nothing of courage, if they are to fight well."

"Of course."

"Then, will horse or dog—or any other animal whatsoever—be willing to be courageous if it's not spirited? Haven't you noticed how

b irresistible and unbeatable spirit[33] is, so that its presence makes every soul fearless and invincible in the face of everything?"

"Yes, I have noticed it."

"As for the body's characteristics, it's plain how the guardian must be."

"Yes."

"And as for the soul's—that he must be spirited."

"That too."

"Glaucon," I said, "with such natures, how will they not be savage to one another and the rest of the citizens?"

"By Zeus," he said, "it won't be easy."

c "Yet, they must be gentle to their own and cruel to enemies. If not, they'll not wait for others to destroy them, but they'll do it themselves beforehand."

"True," he said.

"What will we do?" I said. "Where will we find a disposition at the same time gentle and great-spirited? Surely a gentle nature is opposed to a spirited one."

"It looks like it."

"Yet, if a man lacks either of them, he can't become a good guardian. But these conditions resemble impossibilities, and so it follows that a good guardian is impossible."

d "I'm afraid so," he said.

I too was at a loss, and, looking back over what had gone before, I said, "It is just, my friend, that we're at a loss. For we've abandoned the image we proposed."

"How do you mean?"

"We didn't notice that there are, after all, natures such as we

thought impossible, possessing these opposites." *375 d*

"Where, then?"

"One could see it in other animals too, especially, however, in the one we compared to the guardian. You know, of course, that by nature *e* the disposition of noble dogs is to be as gentle as can be with their familiars and people they know and the opposite with those they don't know."

"I do know that."

"Then," I said, "it is possible, after all; and what we're seeking for in the guardian isn't against nature."

"It doesn't seem so."

"In your opinion, then, does the man who will be a fit guardian need, in addition to spiritedness, also to be a philosopher in his nature?"[34]

"How's that?" he said. "I don't understand." *376 a*

"This, too, you'll observe in dogs," I said, "and it's a thing in the beast worthy of our wonder."

"What?"

"When it sees someone it doesn't know, it's angry, although it never had any bad experience with him. And when it sees someone it knows, it greets him warmly, even if it never had a good experience with him. Didn't you ever wonder about this before?"

"No, I haven't paid very much attention to it up to now. But it's plain that it really does this."

"Well, this does look like an attractive affection of its nature and truly philosophic." *b*

"In what way?"

"In that it distinguishes friendly from hostile looks by nothing other than by having learned the one and being ignorant of the other," I said. "And so, how can it be anything other than a lover of learning since it defines what's its own and what's alien by knowledge and ignorance?"

"It surely couldn't be anything but," he said.

"Well," I said, "but aren't love of learning and love of wisdom the same?"

"Yes, the same," he said.

"So shall we be bold and assert that a human being too, if he is going to be gentle to his own and those known to him, must by nature *c* be a philosopher and a lover of learning?"

"Yes," he said, "let's assert it."

"Then the man who's going to be a fine and good[35] guardian of the city for us will in his nature be philosophic, spirited, swift, and strong."

376 c "That's entirely certain," he said.

"Then he would be of this sort to begin with. But how, exactly, will they be reared and educated by us? And does our considering this contribute anything to our goal of discerning that for the sake of which d we are considering all these things—in what way justice and injustice come into being in a city? We don't want to scant the argument, but we don't want an overlong one either."

And Glaucon's brother said, "I most certainly expect that this present consideration will contribute to that goal."

"By Zeus," I said, "then, my dear Adeimantus, it mustn't be given up even if it turns out to be quite long."

"No, it mustn't."

"Come, then, like men telling tales in a tale and at their leisure, let's educate the men in speech."

e "We must."

"What is the education? Isn't it difficult to find a better one than that discovered over a great expanse of time? It is, of course, gymnastic for bodies and music[36] for the soul."

"Yes, it is."

"Won't we begin educating in music before gymnastic?"

"Of course."

"You include speeches in music, don't you?" I said.

"I do."

"Do speeches have a double form, the one true, the other false?"

"Yes."

377 a "Must they be educated in both, but first in the false?"

"I don't understand how you mean that," he said.

"Don't you understand," I said, "that first we tell tales to children? And surely they are, as a whole, false, though there are true things in them too. We make use of tales with children before exercises."

"That's so."

"That's what I meant by saying music must be taken up before gymnastic."

"That's right," he said.

"Don't you know that the beginning is the most important part of b every work and that this is especially so with anything young and tender? For at that stage it's most plastic, and each thing assimilates itself to the model whose stamp anyone wishes to give to it."

"Quite so."

"Then shall we so easily let the children hear just any tales fashioned by just anyone and take into their souls opinions for the most

part opposite to those we'll suppose they must have when they are grown up?" *377 b*

"In no event will we permit it."

"First, as it seems, we must supervise the makers of tales; and if they make[37] a fine tale, it must be approved, but if it's not, it must be *c* rejected. We'll persuade nurses and mothers to tell the approved tales to their children and to shape their souls with tales more than their bodies with hands. Most of those they now tell must be thrown out."

"Which sort?" he said.

"In the greater tales we'll also see the smaller ones," I said. "For both the greater and the smaller must be taken from the same model and have the same power. Don't you suppose so?" *d*

"I do," he said. "But I don't grasp what you mean by the greater ones."

"The ones Hesiod and Homer told us, and the other poets too. They surely composed false tales for human beings and used to tell them and still do tell them."

"But what sort," he said, "and what do you mean to blame in them?"

"What ought to be blamed first and foremost," I said, "especially if the lie a man tells isn't a fine one."

"What's that?"

"When a man in speech makes a bad representation of what gods *e* and heroes are like, just as a painter who paints something that doesn't resemble the things whose likeness he wished to paint."

"Yes, it's right to blame such things," he said. "But how do we mean this and what sort of thing is it?"

"First," I said, "the man who told the biggest lie about the biggest things didn't tell a fine lie—how Uranus did what Hesiod says he did, and how Cronos in his turn took revenge on him.[38] And Cronos' deeds *378 a* and his sufferings at the hands of his son,[39] not even if they were true would I suppose they should so easily be told to thoughtless young things; best would be to keep quiet, but if there were some necessity to tell, as few as possible ought to hear them as unspeakable secrets, after making a sacrifice, not of a pig but of some great offering that's hard to come by, so that it will come to the ears of the smallest possible number."

"These speeches are indeed harsh," he said.

"And they mustn't be spoken in our city, Adeimantus," I said. *b* "Nor must it be said within the hearing of a young person that in doing the extremes of injustice, or that in punishing the unjust deeds of his father in every way, he would do nothing to be wondered at, but would

378 b be doing only what the first and the greatest of the gods did."

"No, by Zeus," he said. "To say this doesn't seem fitting to me either."

"Above all," I said, "it mustn't be said that gods make war on c gods, and plot against them and have battles with them—for it isn't even true—provided that those who are going to guard the city for us must consider it most shameful[40] to be easily angry with one another. They are far from needing to have tales told and embroideries woven[41] about battles of giants and the many diverse disputes of gods and heroes with their families and kin. But if we are somehow going to persuade them that no citizen ever was angry with another and that to be so is not holy, it's just such things that must be told the children right d away by old men and women; and as they get older, the poets must be compelled to make up speeches for them which are close to these. But Hera's bindings by her son,[42] and Hephaestus' being cast out by his father when he was about to help out his mother who was being beaten,[43] and all the battles of the gods Homer[44] made, must not be accepted in the city, whether they are made with a hidden sense or without a hidden sense. A young thing can't judge what is hidden sense and what is not; but what he takes into his opinions at that age has a e tendency to become hard to eradicate and unchangeable. Perhaps it's for this reason that we must do everything to insure that what they hear first, with respect to virtue, be the finest told tales for them to hear."

"That's reasonable," he said. "But if someone should at this point ask us what they are and which tales we mean, what would we say?"

And I said, "Adeimantus, you and I aren't poets right now but 379 a founders of a city. It's appropriate for founders to know the models according to which the poets must tell their tales. If what the poets produce goes counter to these models, founders must not give way; however, they must not themselves make up tales."

"That's correct," he said. "But, that is just it; what would the models for speech about the gods[45] be."

"Doubtless something like this," I said. "The god must surely always be described such as he is, whether one presents him in epics, lyrics, or tragedies."

"Yes, he must be."

b "Then, is the god really good, and, hence, must he be said to be so?"

"Of course."

"Well, but none of the good things is harmful, is it?"

"Not in my opinion."

"Does that which isn't harmful do harm?"

"In no way."

"Does that which does not harm do any evil?" *379 b*
"Not that, either."
"That which does no evil would not be the cause of any evil?"
"How could it be?"
"What about this? Is the good beneficial?"
"Yes."
"Then it's the cause of doing well?"
"Yes."
"Then the good is not the cause of everything; rather it is the cause of the things that are in a good way, while it is not responsible for the bad things."
"Yes," he said, "that's entirely so." *c*
"Then," I said, "the god, since he's good, wouldn't be the cause of everything, as the many say, but the cause of a few things for human beings and not responsible for most. For the things that are good for us are far fewer than those that are bad; and of the good things, no one else must be said to be the cause; of the bad things, some other causes must be sought and not the god."
"What you say," he said, "is in my opinion very true."
"Then," I said, "we mustn't accept Homer's—or any other poet's—foolishly making this mistake about the gods and saying that *d*

Two jars stand on Zeus's threshold
Full of dooms—the one of good,
the other of wretched;

and the man to whom Zeus gives a mixture of both,

At one time he happens on evil,
at another good;

but the man to whom he doesn't give a mixture, but the second pure,

Evil misery, drives him over the divine
earth;[46]

nor that Zeus is the dispenser to us *e*

Of good and evil alike.[47]

And, as to the violation of the oaths and truces that Pandarus committed, if someone says Athena and Zeus were responsible for its happening,[48] we'll not praise him; nor must the young be allowed to hear that Themis and Zeus were responsible for strife and contention among *380 a*
the gods,[49] nor again, as Aeschylus says, that

God plants the cause in mortals
When he wants to destroy a house utterly.

380 a And if someone produces a 'Sorrows of Niobe,'[50] the work where these iambics are, or a 'Sorrows of the Pelopidae,' or the 'Trojan Sorrows,' or anything else of the sort, either he mustn't be allowed to say that they are the deeds of a god, or, if of a god, he must find a speech for them pretty much like the one we're now seeking; and he must say b the god's works were just and good, and that these people profited by being punished. But the poet mustn't be allowed to say that those who pay the penalty are wretched and that the one who did it was a god. If, however, he should say that the bad men were wretched because they needed punishment and that in paying the penalty they were benefited by the god, it must be allowed. As for the assertion that a god, who is good, is the cause of evil to anyone, great exertions must be made against anyone's saying these things in his own city, if its laws are going to be well observed, or anyone's hearing them, whether he is younger or c older, whether the tale is told in meter or without meter. For these are to be taken as sayings that, if said, are neither holy, nor advantageous for us, nor in harmony with one another."

"I give my vote to you in support of this law," he said, "and it pleases me."[51]

"Now, then," I said, "this would be one of the laws and models concerning the gods, according to which those who produce speeches will have to do their speaking and those who produce poems will have to do their making: the god is not the cause of all things, but of the good."

"And it's very satisfactory," he said.

d "Now, what about this second one? Do you suppose the god is a wizard, able treacherously to reveal himself at different times in different *ideas*, at one time actually himself changing and passing from his own form into many shapes, at another time deceiving us and making us think such things about him? Or is he simple and does he least of all things depart from his own *idea*?"

"On the spur of the moment, I can't say," he said.

"What about this? Isn't it necessary that, if something steps out of e its own *idea*, it be changed either by itself or something else?"

"Yes, it is necessary."

"Are things that are in the best condition least altered and moved by something else—for example, a body by food, drink, and labor, and all plants by the sun's heat, winds, and other affections of the sort; 381 a aren't the healthiest and strongest least altered?"

"Of course."

"And a soul that is most courageous and most prudent, wouldn't an external affection least trouble and alter it?"

"Yes."

"And, again, the same argument surely also holds for all composites, implements, houses, and clothing; those that are well made and in good condition are least altered by time and the other affections." *381 a*

"That's so."

"Hence everything that's in fine condition, whether by nature or art or both, admits least transformation by anything else." *b*

"It seems so."

"Now, the god and what belongs to the god are in every way in the best condition."

"Of course."

"So, in this way, the god would least of all have many shapes."

"Least of all, surely."

"But would he be the one to transform and alter himself?"

"It's plain," he said, "if he's altered at all."

"Does he transform himself into what's better and fairer, or what's worse and uglier than himself?"

"Necessarily into what's worse," he said, "if he's altered at all. For surely we won't say that the god is wanting in beauty or virtue." *c*

"What you say is very right," I said. "And, if this is so, in your opinion, Adeimantus, does anyone, either god or human being, willingly make himself worse in any way at all?"

"It's impossible," he said.

"Then it's impossible," I said, "for a god to want to alter himself, but since, as it seems, each of them is as fair and as good as possible, he remains forever simply in his own shape."

"That's entirely necessary, in my opinion at least," he said.

"Then, you best of men," I said, "let none of the poets tell us that *d*

> The gods, like wandering strangers,
> Take on every sort of shape and visit
> the cities[52]

and let none tell lies about Proteus and Thetis[53] or bring on an altered Hera, either in tragedies or the other kinds of poetry, as a priestess

> Making a collection for the life-giving children
> of Inachus, Argos' river[54]

and let them not lie to us in many other such ways. Nor should the mothers, in their turn, be convinced by these things and frighten the children with tales badly told—that certain gods go around nights looking like all sorts of strangers—lest they slander the gods while at the same time making the children more cowardly." *e*

"No, they shouldn't," he said.

"But," I said, "while the gods themselves can't be transformed, do

381 e they make us think they appear in all sorts of ways, deceiving and bewitching us?"

"Perhaps," he said.

382 a "What?" I said. "Would a god want to lie, either in speech or deed by presenting an illusion?"

"I don't know," he said.

"Don't you know," I said, "that all gods and human beings hate the true lie, if that expression can be used?"

"What do you mean?" he said.

"That surely no one," I said, "voluntarily wishes to lie about the most sovereign things to what is most sovereign in himself. Rather, he fears holding a lie there more than anything."

"I still don't understand," he said.

b "That's because you suppose I mean something exalted," I said. "But I mean that to lie and to have lied to the soul about the things that are, and to be unlearned, and to have and to hold a lie there is what everyone would least accept; and that everyone hates a lie in that place most of all."

"Quite so," he said.

"Now what I was just talking about would most correctly be called truly a lie—the ignorance in the soul of the man who has been lied to. For the lie in speeches is a kind of imitation of the affection in the soul, a phantom of it that comes into being after it, and not quite an

c unadulterated lie. Isn't that so?"

"Most certainly."

"So the real lie is hated not only by gods, but also by human beings."

"Yes, in my opinion."

"Now, what about the one in speeches? When and for whom is it also useful, so as not to deserve hatred? Isn't it useful against enemies, and, as a preventive, like a drug, for so-called friends when from madness or some folly they attempt to do something bad? And, in the

d telling of the tales we were just now speaking about—those told because we don't know where the truth about ancient things lies—likening the lie to the truth as best we can, don't we also make it useful?"

"It is very useful in such cases," he said.

"Then in which of these cases is a lie useful to the god? Would he lie in making likenesses because he doesn't know ancient things?"

"That," he said, "would be ridiculous."

"Then there is no lying poet in a god?"

"Not in my opinion."

"Would he lie because he's frightened of enemies?"

"Far from it." *382 e*

"Because of the folly or madness of his intimates?"

"None of the foolish or the mad is a friend of the gods," he said.

"Then, there's nothing for the sake of which a god would lie?"

"There is nothing."

"Then the demonic[55] and the divine are wholly free from lie."

"That's completely certain," he said.

"Then the god is altogether simple and true in deed and speech, and he doesn't himself change or deceive others by illusions, speeches, or the sending of signs either in waking or dreaming."

"That's how it looks to me too when you say it," he said.

"Do you then agree," I said, "that this is the second model ac- *383 a* cording to which speeches and poems about gods must be made: they are neither wizards who transform themselves, nor do they mislead us by lies in speech or in deed?"

"I do agree."

"So, although we praise much in Homer, we'll not praise Zeus' sending the dream to Agamemnon,[56] nor Thetis' saying in Aeschylus that Apollo sang at her wedding, foretelling good things for her off- spring, *b*

> Free from sickness and living long lives,
> Telling all that the friendship of the gods
> would do for my fortunes,
> He sang the paean, gladdening my spirit.
> And I expected Phoebus' divine mouth
> To be free of lie, full with the diviner's art.
> And he, he who sang, who was at this feast, who
> said this, he is the one who slew my son.

When someone says such things about gods, we'll be harsh and not pro- *c* vide a chorus;[57] and we'll not let the teachers use them for the education of the young, if our guardians are going to be god-revering and divine insofar as a human being can possibly be."

"I am in complete agreement with these models," he said, "and would use them as laws."